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Bibliographic Data
Control Number309186
Date and Time of Latest Transaction20150706095039.AM
General Information150706s |||||||||b ||00|||
Cataloging SourceSTII-DOST
Local Call NumberScienceDirect
Main Entry - Personal NamePutterman, Louis
 Ben-Ner, Avner
Title StatementTrust, communication and contracts an experiment by Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Putterman
Physical Descriptionpages 106-121 computer file; text; 749kb
Summary, Etc.In the one-shot trust or investment game without opportunities for reputation formation or contracting, economic theory predicts no trusting because there is no incentive for trustworthiness. Under these conditions, theory predicts (a) no effect of pre-play communication, and (b) universal preference for moderate cost binding contracts over interacting without contracts. We introduce the opportunities to engage in pre-play communication and to enter binding or non-binding contracts, and find (a) communication increases trusting and trustworthiness, (b) contracts are largely unnecessary for trusting and trustworthy behaviors and are eschewed by many players, (c) more trusting leads to higher earnings, and (d) both trustors and trustees favor “fair and efficient” proposals over the more unequal proposals predicted by theory.04
Subject Added Entry - Topical Termcial sciences04
 ustworthiness04
 mmunication04
 ust game04
 mmitment
LocationST STII ScienceDirect NONPRINTS NP 13-14495 1 13-14495 Online/Download 2010-11-08
  
     
 
Physical Location
Department of Science and Technology
Science and Technology Information InstituteScienceDirect
  
     
 
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